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THE CIVIL JURY-AN 
ENDANGERED SPECIESt 
The Honorable John Feikens* 
George Bernard Shaw, the Irish dramatist and arch gadfly, 
once said, "The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the 
unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to him-
self. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man. "1 
With this tantalizing opener, let me say that I will attempt to 
point out to you my deep concern about the gradual elimination 
of jury trials in civil cases in our country. 
To paraphrase Shaw, I contend that what accounts for my 
concern as to the elimination of jury trials is that a significant 
group of apparently reasonable people in the judicial sys-
tem-judges, professors, and lawyers-are attempting to adapt 
themselves to the world. That world, as they see it, is a world in 
which cases are disposed of in the shortest possible time, with a 
minimum of effort, and at the lowest possible cost. I call this the 
Federal Judicial Center syndrome.2 
What is this syndrome? 
In the last two decades, Americans have had a love affair with 
the courts, and I am sure you are aware of the avalanche of cases 
that has resulted. One result is the bureaucratization of the judi-
cial system: more judges, more magistrates, more staff attorneys, 
and a massive effort to find ways to dispose of cases in the short-
est possible time, with a minimum of effort, and at the lowest 
possible cost. 
Our former Chief Justice, Warren Burger, with his avowed 
. goal of streamlining the judicial system, has led this crusade. 
Coupled with an unusual amour for the British judiciary, which 
t Adapted from an address before the Annual Banquet of the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform. 
• United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan. B.A., 1938, Cal-
vin College; J.D., 1941, University of Michigan. 
1. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 498:1 (3d ed. 1979). 
2. See, e.g., J. CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT (1984); 
M. JACOUBOVITCH & C. MooRE, SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
Omo (1982); J. SHEPARD, APPEALS WITHOUT BRIEFS (1984). The influence of the Federal 
Judicial Center can also be seen in opinions of the Supreme Court. See, for example, 
Chief Justice Burger's response to Justice White's dissent from denial of certiorari in 
Brown Transport Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014, 1025-32 (1978). 
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has done away with the jury trial in civil cases, he has en-
couraged the Federal Judicial Center to emphasize these goals 
for federal judges.3 It is this that I call the syndrome. 
I suppose you detect a note of criticism here. Criticism, by the 
way, is what we say about other people who do not have the 
same faults we have. 
In order to discuss the need for the jury trial in civil cases and 
its gradual elimination, we must start with a discussion of the 
purpose of our adversary system. 
If I were to ask you what the goal of a court trial is, I daresay 
that you would respond that it attempts to ascertain truth. You 
might say that through this confrontation in court the truth of 
what occurred is determined and a judicial decision follows. You 
would be somewhat correct in saying it in that way. Our adver-
sary system has evolved from earlier methods of making deci-
sions-trial by fire, trial by battle-to the current trial in court. 
I suggest to you that this is not the goal of a trial. I suggest 
that the goal is not truth finding. Rather, I say, the goal is jus-
tice; that is to say, the achievement of a just result. And speak-
ing about truth, let me tell you what Mark Twain said: "When 
in doubt, tell the truth."" When he was introduced as the man 
who said that, he replied he had invented that maxim for others, 
but that when in doubt himself, he used more sagacity. 
Some thirty years ago, Justice Roger Traynor, a highly re-
garded associate justice of the Supreme Court of California, 
noted that: "The judicial process deals with probabilities, not 
facts."11 Let me restate that, for it is my subject this evening: the 
judicial process deals with probabilities, not facts. 
Borrowing this phrase, Wright and Graham, in their treatise 
on federal practice and procedure, write: 
To avoid giving these values [truth and justice] exag-
gerated importance it should be kept in mind that the 
"truth" with which the law is content is something less 
than the cosmic variety. "The judicial process, ... deals 
with probabilities, not facts .... " If we knew the 
"truth" -where the plaintiff was going when the accident 
happened, how the defendant treats his family, what the 
3. See, e.g., Burger, The Time is Now for the Intercircuit Panel, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1985, 
at 86. 
4. Notebook of Samuel Langhorne Clemens (Feb. 2, 1894), quoted in THE HOME 
BOOK OF PROVERBS, MAXIMS, AND FAMILIAR PHRASES 2391:18 (B. Stevenson ed. 1948). 
5. Traynor, Fact Skepticism and the Judicial Process, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 636 
(1958). 
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money will be spent for, how the lawyer happened to 
take the case, what his father did to the witness-we 
would be faced with an almost insoluble problem in de-
ciding what justice requires. The law avoids that by mak-
ing this part of the "truth" irrelevant to our decision. 
Rather than the real dispute, the jurors are given an arti-
ficial controversy to be resolved by a consideration of 
much less than half-truths.6 
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To buttress this point, consider the decisions of the Supreme 
Court holding that involuntary confessions cannot be admitted 
as evidence. 7 This is so not because such confessions are not true 
(in most cases they are), but because the method used to extract 
them offends an underlying principle in the enforcement of our 
criminal law-that the government must establish guilt by evi-
dence independently and freely secured.8 
I suggest a just result that considers the values of our society 
is the goal of court trials, that the strictures of truth may con-
flict with a just result, and that the ultimate way of finding jus-
tice is through the use of the jury system in trials. 
In 1873, the Supreme Court said in Railroad Co. v. Stout:9 
Twelve men [and they did not say twelve men and 
women] of the average of the community, comprising 
men of education and men of little education, men of 
learning and men whose learning consists only in what 
they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the 
mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, con-
sult, apply their separate experience of the affairs of life 
to the facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion. 
This average judgment thus given it is the great effort of 
the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know 
more of the common affairs of life than does one man, 
6. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5026, at 152 
(1977) (quoting Traynor, supra note 5, at 638). 
7. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (confession will not be used even 
though ample evidence supports conviction); see also Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 
519 (1968) (confessions given under coercive circumstances are inadmissible); Beecher v. 
Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (confessions resulting from coercion should not be admitted 
into evidence); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (confessions involuntarily 
given under coercive circumstances are inadmissible); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 
(1936) (confessions obtained by torture of accused are inadmissible). See generally 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-13 (1984) (exclusionary rule). 
8. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-45 (1960). 
9. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873). 
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that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from ad-
mitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge. 10 
Judge Learned Hand had a good definition of justice. He said: 
"Justice ... is the tolerable accommodation of the conflicting 
interests of society."11 
Professor Jack Weinstein, now a federal judge, commented on 
justice in the Columbia Law Review in 1966.12 He said: 
Even were it theoretically possible to ascertain truth 
with a fair degree of certainty, it is doubtful whether the 
judicial system and rules of evidence would be designed 
to do so. Trials in our judicial system are intended to do 
more than merely determine what happened. Adjudica-
tion is a practical enterprise serving a variety of func-
tions. Among the goals-in addition to truth find-
ing-which the rules of procedure and evidence in this 
country have sought to satisfy are economizing of re-
sources, inspiring confidence, supporting independent so-
cial policies, permitting ease in prediction and applica-
tion, adding to the efficiency of the entire legal system, 
and tranquilizing disputants.13 
The great value of the jury trial lies in its ability to reach a 
decision in tune with community values. This process constantly 
reinforces our democratic ideals. It is our way of avoiding elitism 
in decisionmaking. To paraphrase Traynor, this is the way in 
which the discrepancies between law in dogmatic theory and law 
in action are melded. . 
In Stout, the Court taught us again that twelve people know 
more of the common affairs of life than does one person; that 
they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts 
than can a single judge. 
Today, as we face the gradual elimination of civil jury trials, 
the argument is being made that there are some cases that are 
too complex for the jury to handle. The Third and the Ninth 
Circuits are on opposite sides of this question. 14 Apart from the 
10. Id. at 664 (emphasis added). 
11. Hamburger, The Great Judge, LIFE, Nov. 4, 1946, at 119, 122-23 (quoting Judge 
L_earned Hand). 
12. Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judi· 
cial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1966). 
13. Id. at 241. 
14. The question originally arose in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). 
The Third Circuit suggested that juries may be incapable of handling complex litigation 
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mandate of the Constitution, which requires jury trials in civil 
cases where damages of more than twenty dollars are sought, the 
contention is that the fifth amendment (due process and a fair 
trial) is more important than the sixth amendment. 
I suggest to you that that argument is specious. Our citizenry 
is constantly called upon to decide ultimate issues affecting the 
existence of our society, and no issue (not even one involving 
IBM) is more important than these: nuclear power, disarma-
ment, budget deficits. The problem is that in complex cases, the 
lawyers and the judges are not skillful enough to focus the jury's 
attention on the ultimate questions and to illuminate those 
questions artistically and competently. In a democratic society 
the ultimate questions cannot be dodged by saying they are too 
complex to decide. 
But what is the suggested solution by those who want to do 
away with the jury trial in complex cases? Their refuge is to say 
that a judge trained in the law should decide them. The diffi-
cult}!' with this is that there is no empirical evidence showing 
that judges are more competent than juries to decide complex 
cases. I remind you again that the Supreme Court has said that 
twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does 
one judge. 
How is this erosion of the jury trial being accomplished? 
1. By the studied use of alternatives to dispute resolution such 
as the summary jury trial and the mini jury trial; 
2. By the reduction in jury size and the use of the majority 
verdict; 
3. By disallowing the taking of notes by jurors; 
4. By disallowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses; 
5. By the prevention of the voir dire examination of jurors by 
lawyers; 
in In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part following summary judgment, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting 
that although summary judgment was improper because it was uncertain that there 
would be a jury trial, summary judgment might be appropriate if the evidence had the 
tendency to confuse or mislead the jury), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). The Ninth Circuit decided the 
other way in In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). 
The issue arises most frequently in major securities and antitrust suits because the 
issues are technical and esoteric and the trials take weeks or months. See Arnold, A 
Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. 
REV. 829 (1980); Campbell, Le Poidevin & Arnold, Discussion: Complex Cases and Jury 
Trials, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 965 (1980). 
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6. By the significant lack of trial advocacy training in law 
schools; and 
7. By the repeated contentions that some cases are too complex 
for jurors to handle. 
I will discuss three of these factors. 
The Federal Judicial Center is sending judges and lawyers 
around the country to judicial conferences to preach the use of 
summary jury trials as an effective way of delivering justice in 
the quickest possible time at the lowest possible cost. This tech-
nique, which I brand a creature of the devil, works in this way: A 
jury of six people is summoned, the lawyers for each side then 
make a fifteen minute presentation, and the jury decides the 
outcome. Although the result is said not to be binding, the par-
ties are expected to see the handwriting on the wall and settle. 
What a travesty! 
I am not opposed to the settlement of cases. I encourage that. 
But this technique is designed to dispose of a case quickly by 
the use of a jury without any of the safeguards that make for a 
just result. 
The parties are required to submit to a procedure to which 
the rules of evidence and civil procedure do not apply. In the 
fifteen minute presentation the lawyers can say anything about 
their cases. Procedures designed to achieve a just result are ig-
nored. No longer is the judicial process dealing with probabili-
ties. There is no burden of proof. Relevancy is not a factor. 
Neither is credibility-the jury sees and hears no witnesses. How 
can the jury in this aborted procedure factor into the result the 
values of the community? It is the use of Russian roulette to 
achieve a disposition of a case. And, ultimately, as it begins to be 
more widely used, it will eliminate the jury trial, as we know it, 
in civil cases. Recently the State Bar of Michigan Assembly, by 
resolution, approved the concept of summary jury trial and sent 
it on for approval to the Michigan Supreme Court. 15 We will 
have the "Sixty Minutes" of television as a role model for our 
jury system. 
What began the downfall of the jury trial in civil cases is the 
reduction of the size of the jury. Traditionally we had juries of 
twelve persons. Now we have six. And in the Michigan state 
15. From the Michigan Supreme Court: Proposed New MCR 2.404, 66 MICH. B.J. 
1148 (1987); see also Brenneman & Wesoloski, Blueprint for a Summary Jury Trial, 65 
MICH. B.J. 888 (1986) (discussing summary jury trial procedure on which proposed MICH. 
CT. R. 2.404 is based). 
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courts, five out of six jurors can reach a majority verdict. What 
has this done to the goal of a just result? 
1. It has eliminated in large measure the need for the jury to 
deliberate and interact to achieve a verdict. Statistics show 
that small juries reach verdicts more quickly and with wide 
aberrations in the verdicts. Such juries do not often disagree 
and thus a hung jury infrequently occurs.16 
2. This technique has also magnified the influence of a domi-
nant person in the jury. One such person in a small jury can 
have significantly more influence, and increasingly so in a 
jury that needs only to reach a majority verdict.17 
3. The reduction in size itself reduces the all-important infu-
sion of community values into the verdict. Thus, the most 
important factor in a just result is downplayed. Speed in ob-
taining a jury and quickness in obtaining a verdict are now 
more important than the deliberative process. In my view, it 
is a cynical view of justice. Getting the case over 
with-achieving a disposition in the quickest possible time 
at the lowest possible cost-is the goal. The cynic says most 
of these cases should not be in court anyway. The next steps 
are already being played. Send them to mediation or arbitra-
tion. Case management is now what judges are supposed to 
do. 
Another attack on the jury trial in civil cases is being 
mounted. These are cases that are simply too complex for a jury 
to handle. In such cases, it is argued, the judge should make the 
decision. Cited are the lengthy antitrust or securities cases with 
thousands of documents, hundreds of witnesses, battalions of 
lawyers, and months of trial. So the facially attractive arguments . 
are trundled out-jurors should not be tied up in trials for so 
lengthy a time, jurors need to be highly educated in order to 
16. Padawer-Singer, Singer & Singer, An Experimental Study of Twelve vs. Six 
Member Juries under Unanimous vs. Nonunanimous Decisions, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE 
LEGAL PROCESS 77, 82 (B. Sales ed. 1977); see also R. SIMON, THE JHRY: ITS ROLE IN 
AMERICAN SOCIETY 75 (1980); Note, A Jury Experiment Reanalyzed, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 
520 (1974); Note, An Empirical Study of Six- and Twelve-Member Jury Decision-Mak-
ing Processes, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 712 (1973); Note, Six-Member and Twelve-Member 
Juries: An Empirical Study of Trial Results, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 671 (1973). 
17. Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and the 
Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REv. 644, 693 (1975). Contra M. SAKS. JURY VERDICTS 11 
(1977). 
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understand the issues, a judge can cut through the maze more 
quickly, a fair trial is more important than a jury trial, etc. 
I suggest that we should retain the jury in complex cases. 
Lawyers and judges have the responsibility for so crystallizing 
the issues that they can be understood. This is the artistry that 
is required of competent professionals. To say that there are 
cases in which this cannot be done begs the question. 
I do believe that in such cases the full use of the device of 
commenting on the evidence should be used by the judge. I con-
tend that the jury should be solely responsible for the verdict, 
but the judge can, by marshalling the evidence and commenting 
on its significance, greatly aid the jury. Commenting on the evi-
dence requires competence and skill on the part of the judge. It 
requires a mastery of the body of complex evidence and an abil-
ity to present that evidence in a way in which the ultimate deci-
sionmaking of the jury is not infringed. Appellate courts have 
not been helpful in this regard. Many have frowned on com-
ments by the court, sometimes justifiably, because it appeared 
from the comments that the court was suggesting to the jury 
what it should do. 
This was not always so. I remember reading a deeision of the 
Supreme Court by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. In that case, 
Justice Holmes approved a comment by the judge in a criminal 
case, which went something like this: 
You, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, have heard all of 
the evidence. It is for you to decide whether the defen-
dant is guilty or not guilty, and you should not be influ-
enced in any way by anything I say. But I can tell you 
this: If I had to make that decision, I would find the de-
fendant guilty.18 
I do not believe that such a comment would be allowed today, 
but the affirmance does indicate that in prior days there was a 
much broader latitude given to judges to comment on the 
evidence. 
But appellate courts should support comments by thoughtful, . 
competent judges as an aid to the jury so that the jury trial is 
retained. The rules governing jury trials have been crafted over 
many decades to ensure fair and just trials. They permit and, in 
my view, encourage judges and juries to act compatibly to 
achieve justice. 
18. See Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920). 
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CONCLUSION 
797 
My central points tonight have been that the goal of our judi-
cial system is the achievement of justice in specific cases and 
that the use of the jury is the best way to achieve that result. I 
have contended that to obtain justice in a case it is of maximum 
importance that a jury which is drawn from the community in 
which the case arises puts into the verdict the values of that 
community. It is in this way that the law deals with probabili-
ties, and justice is achieved. This has high value in a democracy. 
Indeed, if reasonable people in our profession are attempting 
to do away with the jury trial or, at the very least, to limit its 
effective usage in civil cases, then, in the words of Shaw, we 
should round up the unreasonable people in our profession and 
mount the counterattack. 

